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INTRODUCTION
For decades, the major United States airlines have raised passenger fares
through coordinated fare-setting when their route networks overlap,
according to the United States Department of Justice. Through its review of
company documents and testimony, the Justice Department found that when
major airlines have overlapping route networks, they respond to rivals’ price
changes across multiple routes and thereby discourage competition from their
rivals.1 A recent empirical study reached a similar conclusion: It found that
fares have increased for this reason on more than 1000 routes nationwide and
even that American and Delta, two airlines with substantial route overlaps,
have come close to cooperating perfectly on routes they both serve.2
Airlines are not the only major industry in which the major ﬁrms reach
coordinated outcomes in oligopoly markets (that is, markets in which a small
number of ﬁrms are signiﬁcant rivals), leading to higher prices and other
harms to buyers.3 A recent empirical study found that the 2008 joint venture
between Miller and Coors allowed the major brewers to coordinate to reduce
competition between themselves, thereby increasing the price of beer by an

1 In the early 1990s, the government found that when a rival reduced fares, an airline would
commonly price match on that route and also on another route that was a more important route to
the airline that cut fares (for example, a route with an end point at the discounter’s hub). Proposed
Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Airline Tariﬀ Publ’g Co., 59
Fed. Reg. 15,225, 15,225 (Mar. 31, 1994); Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact
Statement, United States v. Airline Tariﬀ Publ’g Co., 58 Fed. Reg. 3,971, 3,971 (Jan. 12, 1993). The
Justice Department more recently alleged that the airlines continue to employ such “cross-market
initiatives” to deter discounting and prevent fare wars. See Amended Complaint at 16, United States
v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-01236-CKK).
Multimarket contact is not the only coordination mechanism that the airlines employ. See, e.g.,
Gaurab Aryal, Federico Ciliberto & Benjamin T. Leyden, Coordinated Capacity Reductions and Public
Communication in the Airline Industry 2 (Becker Friedman Inst., Working Paper No. 2018-11, 2020)
(ﬁnding evidence suggesting that legacy airlines use public communication in quarterly earnings
calls to coordinate on capacity levels).
2 Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit
Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry, 45 RAND J. ECON. 764, 765, 789
(2014) (analyzing data from 2007); see also William N. Evans & Ioannis N. Kessides, Living by the
“Golden Rule”: Multimarket Contact in the U.S. Airline Industry, 109 Q.J. ECON. 341, 341-43 (1994)
(ﬁnding a relationship between greater multimarket contact and higher airline fares using data from
the mid-1980s). Enhanced coordination arising from a substantial increase in multimarket contact
would be expected to raise airfares by two to ﬁve percent on routes where such contact is already at
a moderate level. Ciliberto & Williams, supra, at 85-86.
3 For other empirical examples, see infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. Our Article
focuses on coordination among sellers and does not discuss coordination among buyers, although
many of the issues are parallel.
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estimated six to eight percent.4 They plausibly achieved the higher prices
through leader-follower pricing.5
One possible interpretation of the price increase is that the airlines and
brewers engaged in explicit price-ﬁxing or market division—collusive
conduct that would violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act and would likely be
criminally prosecuted by the Department of Justice if uncovered. That
possibility would suggest that express cartels—those operating under explicit
agreements—often go undetected and undeterred, consistent with what
empirical studies have found. 6 Another interpretation of such evidence,
which is also plausible and, we suspect, more likely, is that oligopoly conduct
can often lead to coordinated outcomes that restrict competition without ﬁrms
expressly colluding on an agreement that would violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.7 They might achieve those coordinated outcomes purposively,
by identifying consensus terms of coordination and deterring cheating, or
arrive at those outcomes simply as a consequence of recognizing their

4 Nathan H. Miller & Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Eﬀects of the MillerCoors
Joint Venture, 85 ECONOMETRICA 1763, 1763 (2017). These price increases are over-and-above price
changes that would have come about were the ﬁrms not coordinating, in the sense of how we use the
term in this Article.
5 See Nathan H. Miller, Gloria Sheu & Matthew C. Weinberg, Oligopolistic Price Leadership and
Mergers: The United States Beer Industry 2-4 (June 14, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1494697/weinbergmillersheu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MTQ-UHNN] (showing that price leadership could lead to higher prices in this
industry and referencing Justice Department pleadings describing the largest brewer as a price leader).
6 Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Yanhao Wei, What Can the Duration of Discovered Cartels Tell Us
About the Duration of All Cartels? 127 ECON. J. 1977, 1978 (2017) (ﬁnding that a cartel has a seventeen
percent chance annually of either collapsing or being discovered); Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow
Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 531, 535 (1991)
(concluding that the Justice Department detects at most thirteen to seventeen percent of cartels
annually). By one back-of-the envelope calculation, nearly twenty-nine express cartels are active in
the United States at any one time, overcharging U.S. buyers by $8.7 billion annually. JONATHAN B.
BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 14 (2019).
7 Coordinated outcomes that did not arise from express collusion can occasionally be addressed
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act by challenging practices facilitating coordination that have been
adopted by agreement among rivals. E.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 336-38
(1969) (ﬁnding that price veriﬁcation on demand stabilized prices); see also id. at 339-40 (Fortas, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the information exchange limited price competition); cf. United States
v. Gen. Elec. Co. and Westinghouse Elec. Co., No. 28228, 1977 WL 1474, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16,
1977) (modifying consent decree to prevent ﬁrms previously convicted of price-ﬁxing from adopting
various practices); Proposed Modiﬁcation of Existing Judgments, United States v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
42 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,004 (Mar. 30, 1977) (describing practices electrical equipment ﬁrms used to
raise prices without express negotiation, including standardized product deﬁnitions, published price
books, and buyer protection policies (such as meeting competition and most-favored-nation
clauses)). One of us has argued that the Federal Trade Commission should use competition
rulemaking to prohibit practices facilitating oligopoly coordination, including practices unilaterally
adopted. See Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly
Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 207-19 (1993).
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interdependence and anticipating the natural and predictable reactions of
their rivals to their price changes.
Whether arrived at purposively or not, these examples of coordinated
conduct suggest that the possibility of coordination among oligopolists is not
eﬀectively prevented by the prospect of Sherman Act liability.8 This theme
contrasts with suggestions by antitrust commentators and courts inﬂuenced
by the Chicago school: that oligopolies usually perform competitively absent
express collusion, and that express collusion itself is diﬃcult and therefore
rare.9 As we describe below, the economics literature does not support those
Chicago claims.
In brief summary of economic concepts that we will explain more fully
below,10 we deﬁne coordinated oligopoly outcomes as price elevation11 arising
from strategic conduct. We say that a ﬁrm acts strategically when in setting
prices, the ﬁrm takes into account how it expects that its rivals will respond–
as one would expect ﬁrms to do when those responses would be strong and
likely to matter to buyers.12 In short, when high prices persist because ﬁrms
are discouraged from cutting price by the anticipated responses of their rivals,
we term the outcome coordinated.13
We term the outcome coordinated regardless of how those anticipated
responses arise.14 Our point is the breadth of this category, not the creation
8 The most inﬂuential antitrust treatise of the mid-twentieth century took a similar view. CARL
KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 110
(1959) (suggesting that the joint exercise of market power, exercised without engaging in conduct
violating the Sherman Act, characterizes “a considerable number” of markets).
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Section I.B.
11 Alterations to nonprice terms of competition that harm buyers would be treated analogously.
We focus on price for concreteness.
12 When both anticipated rival responses (“conjectural variations” in economic language) and
buyer reactions (“diversion ratios” in economic language) are substantial, these factors will
substantially aﬀect the ﬁrm’s gain or loss of customers in response to its cutting or raising its price
and therefore its incentive to do so. For textbook discussions of the determination of equilibrium
prices in oligopoly when ﬁrms have nonzero conjectural variations, see STEPHEN MARTIN,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN CONTEXT 75 (2010); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 206-08 (3d ed. 1990).
13 The noncoordinated benchmark for price is thus the price that would arise if ﬁrms behaved
nonstrategically, that is, in a static Nash equilibrium when ﬁrms choose price or output, a widely
used framework for antitrust and economic analysis. That framework is often in practice identiﬁed
with “unilateral” oligopoly conduct, which in turn is commonly taken to be distinct from
“coordinated” conduct. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES (2010) 20-27, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/
2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V2K-D3CN] [hereinafter 2010 HMG] (discussing
unilateral and coordinated eﬀects separately).
14 Our deﬁnition is consistent with the way coordination is described in the horizontal merger
guidelines. The 2010 Guidelines state: “Coordinated interaction involves conduct by multiple ﬁrms
that is proﬁtable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others.” Id.
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of new dichotomies, but we nevertheless distinguish two types of responses.
When ﬁrms act on the expectation that rivals will punish cheating on a
common understanding in order to sustain and implement that
understanding, we call the strategic conduct “purposive.”15 In other cases, the
strategic conduct is “nonpurposive.” We use the latter term when ﬁrms
respond to one another’s price changes in a natural and predictable business
way, rather than as a part of a scheme or attempt to develop a consensus or
deter price-cutting. As Donald Turner explained nearly six decades ago, a
rational oligopolist understands that its rivals will “inevitably react” when it
cuts prices “because otherwise the price cut will make a substantial inroad on
their sales.” 16 That rivals will “inevitably react” can lead to coordinated
outcomes even when ﬁrms do not seek to develop a common understanding
or punish cheating. We view the distinction between purposive and
nonpurposive conduct as suggestive and useful, but not as setting forth an

at 24. Similarly, the 1992 Guidelines state: “Coordinated interaction is comprised of actions by a
group of ﬁrms that are proﬁtable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions
of the others.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 17 (1992) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11250.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3XYF-6Y69] [hereinafter 1992 HMG].
15 We use the term “purposive” to convey an important distinction both among forms of
conduct and among ways of analyzing conduct, but we do not mean to suggest all possible
connotations of the term. We do not intend the term to be interpreted to incorporate all conduct
undertaken in anticipation of likely responses. For instance, if (as in economists’ Stackelberg
equilibrium) a price leader commits to its price and others set their prices to maximize their proﬁts
in reliance on that commitment, we would call the leader’s strategic conduct nonpurposive. But if
the followers always match the leader’s price even when that is not their best response based on costs
and demand, because they expect the leader to punish them if they do otherwise, we would call the
leader’s conduct purposive. Purposive strategic conduct is closer to “negotiating” or “scheming” or
“rewarding and punishing” than to naturally “reacting.” The distinction is also analogous to the
distinction Thomas Schelling makes between a “warning” and a “threat.” Both are communications
aimed at shaping the responses of others (which could be other nations, in international aﬀairs). A
warning describes what would already (absent the communication) be the actor’s true and inherent
interest (akin to a natural and predictable, or nonpurposive, response), while a threat communicates
a calculated commitment to a position not otherwise in the actor’s interest (akin to conduct that
would be purposive if carried out). THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 12324 (1960). The term “purposive” may also mislead to the extent it suggests that the distinction turns
on the subjective intent of the decisionmakers at the ﬁrms. Intent evidence may aid in understanding
and interpreting conduct, however. See infra text accompanying notes 66–69 (providing hypothetical
examples of documentary or testimonial evidence relevant to classifying strategic conduct as
purposive or nonpurposive).
16 Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 665 (1962). If, for example, Turner explains, “there are
only three producers of equal size and a price cut by one doubles his sales, the sales of each of his
two competitors will be cut in half.” Id.
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analytically watertight classiﬁcation scheme. 17 Indeed, these two forms of
strategic conduct can coexist,18 and there undoubtedly are gray areas.
The previously referenced studies of airlines and brewing found that ﬁrms
reached coordinated outcomes but did not seek to distinguish between
purposive and nonpurposive conduct. Either type of strategic conduct could
result in price leadership (brewing) or be facilitated by greater multimarket
contact (airlines).19 It is nonetheless important for antitrust enforcement to
be alert for risks both of purposive and of nonpurposive strategic conduct.
Because so much recent antitrust discussion has focused on coordinated
outcomes arising from purposive conduct, distinguishing between the two
forms—even while recognizing that some strategic conduct is hard to
classify—is helpful in drawing proper attention to nonpurposive
coordination, and, relatedly, in understanding why antitrust commentators
and courts inﬂuenced by the Chicago school wrongly dismiss the latter
possibility. Distinguishing the two types of strategic conduct also facilitates
a detailed economic analysis of the competitive eﬀects of ﬁrm conduct, as we
illustrate below with respect to evaluating the coordinated eﬀects of
horizontal mergers.
As has long been recognized, the diﬃculty of attacking express cartels and
the Sherman Act’s circumscribed coverage of other forms of coordination20
gives horizontal merger enforcement an important prophylactic role: it
increases the importance of preventing changes in market structure through
17 To illustrate the distinctions our framework makes using categories and concepts taken from
economic theory, suppose price is the decision variable. If the oligopolists adopt Bertrand-Nash responses
(conjectures of zero) in a one-time interaction, the outcome is our noncoordination benchmark. If the
firms have continuous and nonzero conjectures that are not history-dependent, and prices exceed
benchmark levels, the outcome is coordinated and we would likely say achieved through nonpurposive
strategic behavior. If the firms’ strategies are discontinuous and history-dependent, as with punishment
responses, the outcome is coordinated and achieved through purposive conduct. In particular we would
apply that label to express collusion (for example, an express agreement to raise price or allocate markets
or customers), which often involves such punishment responses.
18 See MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 41 (2006) (indicating
that a factor that makes coordination easier is likely to do so both when firms talk and when they do not).
More generally, purposive and nonpurposive coordinated conduct will coexist when an oligopoly
supergame model leads to elevated prices while supposing that the oligopolists revert to an outcome
consistent with some nonpurposive coordination (an outcome that falls short of joint profitmaximization) in the event the coordinated outcome from purposive conduct falls apart.
19 In discussing their results, though, the authors of these studies plausibly adopt purposive
conduct interpretations. The authors of the brewing study take a modeling perspective that
presumes purposive conduct. Miller, Sheu & Weinberg, supra note 5, at 2. The authors of the airlines
study interpret increased multimarket conduct as loosening incentive compatibility constraints on
coordinated outcomes, Ciliberto & Williams, supra note 2, at 764, and discuss some of their results
in terms of incentives to deviate from a coordinated outcome. Id. at 769, 780.
20 The Sherman Act has been interpreted to insulate many coordinated outcomes from
antitrust liability. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2015)
(“Express collusion violates antitrust law; tacit collusion does not.”).
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a horizontal merger that would make coordinated outcomes more likely or
more eﬀective.21 The Clayton Act focuses on whether a horizontal merger
will harm competition, including by making coordination more likely or more
eﬀective, regardless of whether the coordination would independently violate
the Sherman Act. For this reason, we look to merger enforcement when
discussing the implications of our analysis for antitrust.22
Although we explore a more detailed and nuanced economic analysis, one
important conclusion is straightforward: whether through purposive or
nonpurposive conduct, greater concentration can be expected to make
coordination more likely, stronger, or more eﬀective. Accordingly, our
analysis supports a structural merger policy, by which mergers between rivals
that increase concentration signiﬁcantly in a concentrated market are
presumed to harm competition.
In Part I of our Article, we explain why coordinated conduct is a serious
concern. We explain in Part II why we disagree with the Chicago views that
such conduct is unlikely absent express collusion and that express collusion
itself is uncommon. Part III explains how our analysis of coordination should
apply to merger enforcement.
I. THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATED OLIGOPOLY CONDUCT
Modern economics oﬀers many reasons to think that coordinated
outcomes may arise and persist in oligopoly markets. We begin with
empirical, experimental, and real-world evidence, then review the relevant
economic theory.
21 See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 901(b)(2) (4th ed. 2016) (explaining that a
“central objective of merger policy is to obstruct” the creation of “oligopolistic market structures in which
tacit coordination can occur”); 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1432(d)(5) (3d ed. 2010)
(describing the “containment” approach of addressing the oligopoly problem through prohibiting
concentrating mergers and facilitating practices); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy,
70 HASTINGS L.J. 45, 51-55 (2018) (justifying an incipiency test under the Clayton Act based on the
threat of post-merger coordination that would not violate the Sherman Act); cf. Richard A. Posner,
Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1566 (1969) (indicating that
the “extraordinary stringency” of the merger guidelines that the Justice Department promulgated while
Donald Turner was Assistant Attorney General “may reflect in part Turner’s earlier expressed view that
once a market has become highly concentrated there is little that can be done under existing law to
prevent noncompetitive, interdependent pricing”).
22 Our view of coordination is also relevant to a number of other important antitrust issues we do
not discuss, including identifying express collusion, inferring collusive agreements from circumstantial
evidence, and analyzing the horizontal consequences of vertical mergers. For analyses of economic issues
raised by express collusion and its prosecution, see generally JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., THE
THEORY OF COLLUSION AND COMPETITION POLICY (2017); ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M.
MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS (2012).
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A. Empirical, Experimental, and Real-World Evidence
The relevant empirical literature extends beyond the previously discussed
studies of airlines and brewing. 23 Studies have found that through strategic
conduct leading to coordinated outcomes, prices of cellular telephone services
increased between seven and ten percent; and prices for hospital services offered
by multi-hospital systems increased between six and seven percent.24 In one
urban retail gasoline market, dominant firms engaged in price leadership to
establish, after many years of trying, coordinated prices as high as fifteen percent
above those that would otherwise have prevailed without coordination.25
Empirical studies have also found that express cartels—one type of
purposive coordination—are durable. According to one study, the average
cartel lasted approximately eight years, even though many cartels in the
sample were terminated by antitrust enforcement. 26 Some cartels have
survived more than forty years. 27 These results indicate that coordinated
outcomes, once attained, can readily be sustained.
Economists have identiﬁed a wide range of factors thought to facilitate
coordination. One typical list includes: a small number of ﬁrms, simple or
homogenous products, open and transparent transactions, excess capacity in
the hands of rivals, predictable demand, small and frequent transactions,
small buyers, inelastic market demand, low marginal costs relative to price,
and high customer switching costs.28 The experimental economics literature
23 See Christopher John Sullivan, The Ice Cream Split: Empirically Distinguishing Price and
Product Space Collusion, in Three Essays on Product Collusion 36, 65 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/
138544/sullivcj_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/VA2P-TYKM] (ﬁnding that
through coordination over prices and product oﬀerings of super-premium ice cream, Ben & Jerry’s
and Häagen-Dazs raised average prices by nine and eleven percent, respectively).
24 Matt Schmitt, Multimarket Contact in the Hospital Industry, 10 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y
361, 363 (2018); Meghan R. Busse, Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular Telephone
Industry, 9 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 287, 317 (2000). For both industries, the studies found
that coordinated outcomes were facilitated by multimarket conduct, as was found with airlines.
25 David P. Byrne & Nicolas de Roos, Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline, 109
AM. ECON. REV. 591, 600 (2019).
26 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of
Cartel Duration, 54 J.L. & ECON. 455, 463 (2011); see also Ari Hyytinen, Frode Steen & Otto
Toivanen, Cartels Uncovered, 10 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 190, 210 (2018) (ﬁnding that
legal cartels in Finland had an average expected duration of 8.5 years); Harrington & Wei, supra
note 6, at 1998, 2002 (ﬁnding that cartels discovered by the Justice Department, and thus terminated
by antitrust enforcement, had an average duration of 5.8 years; adjusted for a statistical bias, the
estimated average duration is between 5.3 and 6.8 years).
27 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 43, 53 tbl.2 (2006) (indicating that a number of cartels lasted at least forty years).
28 ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHAN B. BAKER & JOSHUA D. WRIGHT,
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION
POLICY 298-306 (3d ed. 2017) (setting forth factors facilitating or frustrating coordination and

2020] Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, & Horizontal Mergers

1993

supports many of these predictions—and, in doing so, ﬁnds that coordinated
outcomes are achieved and sustained in a range of laboratory settings, though
they are missed or fall apart in others.29
Experimental studies have found occasional coordinated outcomes in
“prisoners’ dilemma” experiments when ﬁrms interact in a single period or
for a ﬁxed and certain number of periods. 30 These are settings where
economic models suggest that rational actors would do otherwise. The
behavioral economics literature suggests that concerns for fairness and a
desire for vengeance may support coordination by inducing ﬁrms to punish
cheating even when that would not be a rational response. 31 A recent
experimental study lends some support. It ﬁnds that that coordination is
more stable when ﬁrms target speciﬁc rivals for punishment rather than when
they allow a coordinated consensus to break down, particularly when a large
number of ﬁrms coordinate—that is to say, when the incentives of any
explaining their rationales). While lists of factors facilitating coordination like these have typically
been created with purposive strategic conduct and the problem of inferring an agreement among
rivals from circumstantial evidence in mind, the same factors would often also plausibly make
nonpurposive coordination more of a threat.
29 See generally Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, Experimental Economics in Antitrust,
in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 229, 230-37 (Roger
D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014); Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, Oligopoly Experiments in the
Current Millennium, 27 J. ECON. SURVEYS 439, 448-50 (2013); Charles A. Holt, Industrial
Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS 349, 398-416 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
30 Holt, supra note 29, at 402. In a prisoner’s dilemma, a common, simple, and well-known way
of modeling oligopoly interactions, all ﬁrms would proﬁt if they can reach and sustain a coordinated
outcome. But each ﬁrm would ﬁnd it even more proﬁtable to cheat on that outcome if they knew
that their rivals would not respond. In a single-period interaction, or a repeated interaction over a
known ﬁxed period, standard theory would predict that the temptation to cheat prevents successful
coordination. See id. at 399 (explaining how the prisoner’s dilemma game models the possibility of
coordinated outcomes); see also William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Coordinated Eﬀects in Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful
Minds and Mavericks (April 24, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11050.htm
[https://perma.cc/X783-UND4] (same).
31 Mark Armstrong & Steﬀen Huck, Behavioral Economics and Antitrust, in 1 THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 205, 212-13 (Roger D. Blair & D.
Daniel Sokol eds., 2014) (noting that “vengeance induces more aggressive punishments for
deviating”). For game theoretic work on the possibility of collusion when ﬁrms predictably evade
following through on threatened punishments that harm the punisher, see Joseph Farrell & Eric
Maskin, Renegotiation in Repeated Games, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 327, 328 (1989) (noting that
instead of punishing the violator in ways that would hurt other participants, “it seems plausible that
[ﬁrms] will renegotiate back to mutual cooperation”), B. Douglas Bernheim & Debraj Ray, Collective
Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 295, 296-97 (1989) (noting the
possibility of ﬁrms renegotiating self-enforcing agreements), and Joseph Farrell, Renegotiation in
Repeated Oligopoly Interaction, in INCENTIVES, ORGANIZATION, AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 303, 306
(Peter J. Hammond & Gareth D. Myles eds., 2000) (noting that in less concentrated markets, “full
collusion (or anything close to it) is inconsistent with what might seem a reasonable form of
renegotiation-proofness”).
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individual ﬁrm to punish would be weak absent concerns for fairness.32 In
addition, behavioral economists have raised the possibility that ﬁrms would
choose not to cheat on a coordinated consensus even when it would appear
rational do so if the coordinating ﬁrms can foster a sense of loyalty or esprit
de corps among themselves.33
Real-world evidence similarly conﬁrms the plausibility of coordinated
oligopoly outcomes. Antitrust enforcers have found that express cartels with
ﬁve or six (or even ten or more) members are not uncommon.34 Business
schools routinely teach the adoption of practices that facilitate coordination
without risking antitrust liability.35
Coordination may not easily be recognized because coordinated outcomes in
real-world markets, while harmful, do not necessarily approach the joint profitmaximizing outcome that a monopolist would achieve. Empirical studies and
the case law show that coordination can be incomplete or imperfect in many
ways, and that coordinated outcomes may be accompanied by conduct that is
competitive in some respects.36 This should not be surprising. Firms matching
rivals’ price-cuts is, from one perspective, quintessentially competitive behavior.
But when firms anticipate that their rivals will behave that way—either in a
natural business way or as a response to cheating—that expected reaction, which
may seem competitive, can make coordinated outcomes possible by discouraging
price-cutting in the first instance.
Even express cartels may not coordinate perfectly. The records of one
express cartel, the early 20th-century Sugar Institute, indicated that it would
allow occasional cheating to go unpunished. 37 There are a number of other
32 Catherine Roux & Christian Thöni, Collusion Among Many Firms: The Disciplinary Power of
Targeted Punishment, 116 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 83, 91 (2015). A number of prior experimental
studies varying the number of market participants had found that tacit collusion was often
unsuccessful outside of duopoly. Id. at 83-84.
33 Armstrong & Huck, supra note 31, at 214.
34 Kolasky, supra note 30; Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel
Success?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 43, 59 tbl.4 (2006); see also John William Hatﬁeld, Scott Duke
Kominers & Richard Lowery, Collusion in Brokered Markets 3-4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper
No. 20-023, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3450767 [https://perma.cc/6PG3-JG35] (explaining
high real estate commission rates in markets with large numbers of independent brokers in terms of
a supergame model of oligopoly conduct).
35 This has been common for at least four decades. Cf. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE
STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 92-95 (1980)
(encouraging ﬁrms to seek to improve all ﬁrms’ positions by employing active market signaling
through announcements, selective advertising to discipline recalcitrant rivals, and price leadership);
id. at 106 (advocating standardization to simplify industry prices and other decision variables so that
oligopolists can establish an advantageous focal point for their industry).
36 See infra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.
37 David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence
from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 379, 393 (2001) (noting that, although “wholesale
cheating” was punished, “some cheating” was not, and collusion was “(imperfectly) sustained”).
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examples of successful price-fixing or bid-rigging with some cheating. 38
Moreover, some cartels collude on some but not all competitive dimensions.
British Airways and its co-conspirators colluded to set passenger fuel charges on
air travel between the United States and the United Kingdom but not on the
base air fare.39 Sotheby’s and its auction house co-conspirators colluded to set
the commission charged to sellers but not the commissions charged to buyers.40
Imperfect coordination can also exist outside of express cartels.
Coordinated prices probably fell short of monopoly levels in the brewing,
airlines, cellular telephone, hospital, and urban gasoline industry examples
that were the subject of empirical studies we previously discussed. 41
Empirical studies have also identiﬁed markets such as the 19th-century
railroad industry in which coordinated outcomes in some periods were
punctuated by occasional price wars in others42 as well as markets in which
coordination took place on some but not all competitive dimensions.43

38 B. Douglas Bernheim & Erik Madsen, Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels,
107 AM. ECON. REV. 387, 390-93 (2017) (describing cheating in various cartels, including a lysine
cartel, a food ﬂavor-enhancing nucleotide cartel, a citric acid producers’ cartel, the Sugar Institute
cartel, and the OPEC cartel).
39 The airlines also colluded to set cargo shipment rates on the same routes. Plea Agreement at 3–
6, United States v. British Airways PLC, No. 07-183 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2007) (describing British Airways’s
admission of guilt as to fixing the cargo rate as well as well as the passenger fuel surcharge).
40 Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Sotheby’s Holdings Inc., No. 00-1081, 2000 WL
35630180 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2000).
41 In general, one would expect imperfect coordination to be more likely when oligopolists
coordinate by identifying a focal outcome, as through price leadership, rather than by explicitly
communicating. Explicitly discussing terms of coordination would likely better reach the joint
proﬁt-maximizing outcome, but would also risk antitrust enforcement under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. See Baker, supra note 7, at 165 n.43 (“[T]he feasible set of coordinated equilibria . . .
that are consistent with a plausible focal rule. . . . need not contain the joint proﬁt-maximizing
equilibrium.”); MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 22, at 16 (arguing that coordination without explicit
communication tends to allow “[d]eviations induced by self-interest proﬁt maximization [to] creep
into [ﬁrms’] conduct, and joint proﬁts will fall short of monopoly levels”).
42 See generally Glenn Ellison, Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee, 25
RAND J. ECON. 37 (1994) (studying the Joint Executive Committee, an 1880s railroad cartel);
Robert H. Porter, On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 415 (1985) (same);
Robert H. Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886, 14 BELL J.
ECON. 301 (1983) (same). This phenomenon has also been observed in other industries. See, e.g.,
Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty: The U.S. Steel Industry, 1933-1939, 32
J.L. & ECON. S47, S67, S71 (1989) (ﬁnding that occasional price wars in response to unexpected
declines in demand (that is, marketplace punishments) supported coordination in the steel industry
during the late 1930s); Timothy F. Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile
Industry: The 1955 Price War, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 457, 471-72 (1987) (ﬁnding evidence suggesting that
auto makers’ coordinated behavior was brieﬂy interrupted by competitive behavior before returning
to coordination).
43 Frode Steen & Lars Sørgard, Disadvantageous Semicollusion: Price Competition in the
Norwegian Airline Industry (NHH Dept. of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 27 2012, 2012),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2205825 [https://perma.cc/B363-4DSL].
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B. Economic Theory
Economic theory looks at coordinated outcomes resulting from strategic
conduct in two general ways. In one perspective, oligopolists are seen as
collectively working towards a market outcome (for instance, a price level and
an allocation of market shares), constrained by the need to design or at least
identify intended responses to cheating on that outcome that are both credible
and sufficiently punitive to minimize the cheating concern.44 Oligopolists are
usually viewed as focusing on sustainable (self-enforcing) market outcomes that
maximize profits, though that focus is not essential to this perspective.
In the other perspective, oligopolists’ natural and predictable business
responses to one another’s price changes are the starting point, and a
coordinated outcome emerges organically from the interplay of those
responses.45 Substantial coordination can arise in such a framework, but there
is no expectation that the coordinated outcome would maximize anything.
When coordinated outcomes arise from purposive conduct, oligopolists
consciously or purposively put in place responses that discourage pricecutting because they collectively want the resulting high prices and are trying
to make them stick. This path to coordination involves some activity aimed
at reaching consensus on terms of coordination and enforcing that
consensus. 46 This may involve determining the prices the ﬁrms will each
charge, the output they will each produce, or the customers they will each
serve. It may also involve clarifying how they will deﬁne, diagnose and punish
cheating. Simple economic models often assume that cheating on the
consensus by price-cutting will be punished by vigorous retaliatory price cuts,
though other punishment strategies are also possible.47 We will occasionally
44 In technical language, economists taking this perspective model coordination as a choice of
a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a repeated game. Often the focus is on outcomes that maximize
proﬁts (or something else) among the subgame-perfect equilibria. For recent examples of economic
discussions of antitrust policy that view coordination through this lens, see generally Robert H.
Porter, Mergers and Coordinated Eﬀects, INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. (forthcoming 2020) (on ﬁle with
authors); Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright & Jean Tirole, The Economics of
Tacit Collusion: Final Report for DG Competition, European Commission (IDEI, Working Paper No. 186,
2003), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion
_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/RBC6-LMHQ].
45 In technical terms, this approach calls on the ideas of conjectural variations.
46 Successful coordination also requires that the outcome not be entirely undermined by the
entry of new competitors or expansion by noncoordinating rivals. E.g., Levenstein & Suslow, supra
note 27, at 44 (noting that coordination is threatened by “entry (or expansion) by non[-coordinating]
ﬁrms”). We assume throughout that coordinating ﬁrms are free from new competition or can deter
it, at least to a degree that makes coordination among them proﬁtable and of concern.
47 When the major airlines went beyond matching rival fare cuts to reduce fares on routes
important to the rivals, see supra text accompanying note 1 (discussing conduct by airlines subject to
Justice Department enforcement separately in the 1990s and the 2010s), they were plausibly engaging
in purposive conduct.
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use the term “purposive coordination” as shorthand for coordinated outcomes
arising from purposive conduct.
A prominent, though simpliﬁed, theoretical model of purposive oligopoly
conduct ﬁnds that even hundreds of rival ﬁrms interacting repeatedly can
sustain monopoly prices without creating net incentives to cheat. 48
Coordinated outcomes often remain feasible even after adding to the model
complications like diﬀerences across ﬁrms in costs and product features,
uncertainty about demand, and slowed or limited punishment responses to
rival cheating.49 The theoretical literature also recognizes that coordinated
conduct could be limited to some but not all competitive dimensions.50
Purposive coordination includes, but is broader than, expressly collusive
conduct such as price-fixing and market division. Much discussion of “tacit
collusion” in antitrust commentary explores how firms might purposively find
their way toward a consensus plan and enforce it through price reactions without
necessarily engaging in conduct that would violate the Sherman Act. 51 By
defining “coordinated” outcomes in economic terms, we include, but do not limit
the concept to, outcomes that result from “collusion”: a legal term that usually
carries the idea of an agreement,52 which is a predicate for liability under Section
1 of the Sherman Act.53 Even when strategic conduct is purposive, if consensus
high prices are reached through leader-follower pricing conduct, that outcome

48 Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 329, 365–66 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).
49 See, e.g., Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price
Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 89-94 (1984) (identifying the feasibility of coordination in
markets with uncertainty about demand).
50 See, e.g., Frode Steen & Lars Sørgard, Semicollusion, 5 FOUND. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS
153, 165–66 (2009) (describing the theory of coordination on one choice variable, a dimension of rivalry,
while competing on others); David T. Levy & James D. Reitzes, Basing-Point Pricing and Incomplete
Collusion, 33 J. REGIONAL SCI. 27, 29-33 (1993) (same); Chaim Fershtman & Neil Gandal,
Disadvantageous Semicollusion, 12 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 141, 152 (1994) (same).
51 Since the mid-1970s, under the inﬂuence of the Chicago approach to antitrust, the term
“tacit collusion” has come to mean no more than an agreement proved through circumstantial
evidence. Baker, supra note 7, at 145. As a matter of logic, however, an express agreement (in which
the parties provide each other with explicit assurances, usually verbal, that they will carry out their
promises) proved through circumstantial evidence is not the same as a tacit understanding (in which
no such assurances are given). Id. at 145 n.7.
52 Id. at 152 n.16. In our framework, express collusion can be understood as purposive strategic
behavior in which equilibrium selection involves conscious and explicit scheming, most likely
through talking. An “agreement” can be understood as a coordinated outcome reached through what
one of us has termed the “forbidden process” of negotiation and exchange of assurances, rather than
through the sort of leader-follower behavior that ﬁrms cannot be expected to avoid and that courts
cannot be expected to remedy. Id. at 179, 191.
53 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). We follow the common practice of summarizing the “contract,
combination[,] . . . or conspiracy” language of the statute through the term “agreement.” Id.
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would probably not be deemed to have resulted from an “agreement.” 54
Coordinated outcomes arising from nonpurposive strategic conduct are even
less likely to satisfy the agreement requirement of Section 1.
When oligopolists respond to one another’s price changes in a natural
business way, they are engaged in nonpurposive strategic conduct. Although
those reactions are not part of an express scheme or an informal effort to develop
a common understanding or deter price-cutting, those predictable responses will
generally affect oligopolists’ incentives and may well discourage price-cutting.
As the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines note, coordination “includes
situations in which each rival’s response to competitive moves made by others is
individually rational and not motivated by retaliation or deterrence nor intended
to sustain an agreed-upon market outcome, but nevertheless emboldens price
increases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce prices or offer customers
better terms.” 55 We call this type of strategic conduct “nonpurposive” (and
occasionally refer to coordinated outcomes arising from such conduct as
“nonpurposive coordination”). As was recognized by Donald Turner in the midtwentieth century, 56 nonpurposive coordination is likely to be common in
oligopoly and difficult to prohibit—difficult even for intelligent oligopolists to
avoid and difficult for judges to remedy.
To motivate our view that coordination from nonpurposive conduct is
common, we begin by observing that oligopolists typically monitor and
respond to rivals’ price changes.57 When one ﬁrm cuts its price and another
responds naturally, as we put it above, we have in mind that the second ﬁrm
is responding in a predictable way to an objective change in its business
environment. The second ﬁrm might naturally respond by cutting price, for
example, if it expects the ﬁrst ﬁrm’s new price to persist, if the second ﬁrm
loses some of what it had been thinking of as reliable customers, or if it learns
from observing the price reduction that the ﬁrst ﬁrm has lower costs or a
diﬀerent business strategy than it had believed. These responses need not be
part of an eﬀort to enforce a consensus on terms of coordination; they are just
what ﬁrms naturally and predictably do. Not surprisingly, the economics
54 Richard Posner and Donald Turner famously debated whether “conscious parallelism,”
including leader-follower conduct, should be deemed an “agreement” under the Sherman Act. See
GAVIL ET AL., supra note 28, at 320-24 (surveying the Turner-Posner debate). Turner’s position—
that it would be impractical for courts to interpret the Sherman Act to reach such conduct, even
when the economic consequences mirrored those of express collusion, because the conduct is
unavoidable and courts cannot be expected to devise viable remedies that avoid chilling beneﬁcial
conduct—has largely prevailed. Id. at 322.
55 2010 HMG, supra note 13, at 24-25.
56 See supra notes 16 & 54 and accompanying text.
57 Such conduct is a common source of evidence in market deﬁnition, where it is a basis for
inferring what ﬁrms think about buyer substitution patterns. Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition:
An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 141 (2007).
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literature has long recognized that objective sources of oligopoly dynamics
such as these can lead to coordinated outcomes.58
Prominent theoretical models of nonpurposive oligopoly conduct suggest
the plausibility of coordinated outcomes. In one, ﬁrms match rivals’
competitive decisions before customers react (so-called “quick responses”).59
Edward Chamberlin’s simpliﬁed and informal quick response model, in which
he pointed out that oligopolists could have strong incentives to charge the
monopoly price,60 was inﬂuential in shaping the skepticism about oligopoly
that commonly characterized courts and commentators during antitrust’s
structural era, which dated from the 1940s through the late 1970s.61
In another prominent model of nonpurposive oligopoly conduct,62 each
ﬁrm chooses its price based on (reacting to) the price that its rival most
recently chose and that will brieﬂy persist, but does not otherwise consider
how the ﬁrm’s rival behaved in the past.63 In this model, Eric Maskin and
58 See, e.g., Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity
Competition with Large Fixed Costs, 56 ECONOMETRICA 549, 553 (1988); Edward H. Chamberlin,
Duopoly: Value Where Sellers Are Few, 44 Q.J. ECON. 63, 65, 88 (1929). The economics literature has
similarly identiﬁed oligopoly dynamics arising from objective sources in other contexts. See generally
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs, 19 RAND J. ECON. 123
(1988) (identifying switching costs as the objective source); Alan Beggs & Paul Klemperer, MultiPeriod Competition with Switching Costs, 60 ECONOMETRICA 651 (1992) (same); Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 55 (1992)
(identifying network eﬀects as the objective source).
59 Quick rival responses are plausibly understood as nonpurposive reactions to the immediate
competitive environment, although they could also arise from purposive conduct. See generally
Robert M. Anderson, Quick-Response Equilibrium (Oct. 26, 1985) (unpublished manuscript) (on
ﬁle with authors); V. Bhaskar, Quick Responses in Duopoly Ensure Monopoly Pricing, 29 ECON.
LETTERS 103 (1989).
60 Chamberlin, supra note 58, at 86, 89. See generally EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 48 (8th ed. 1962) (describing the tendency to charge
the monopoly price).
61 During that period, the courts and antitrust enforcers were even hostile to small horizontal
mergers in markets that would be considered unconcentrated by today’s standards. See, e.g., United
States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines
(1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,101 (showing antitrust enforcers’ hostility to
horizontal mergers between ﬁrms with low shares in less concentrated markets).
62 See Maskin & Tirole, supra note 58. In the model, the timing of adjustment costs creates short
term commitments, which affect rival reactions. See Engelbert J. Dockner, A Dynamic Theory of
Conjectural Variations, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 377 (1992) (exploring the relationship between dynamic
oligopolistic competition and static conjectural variations equilibria in a model with adjustment costs);
Luis M.B. Cabral, Conjectural Variations as a Reduced Form, 49 ECON. LETTERS 397, 397-98 (1995)
(identifying a dynamic game where the conjectural variation solution is an exact reduced form); cf. Zach
Y. Brown & Alexander MacKay, Competition in Pricing Algorithms 3-5 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper
No. 20-067, 2020) (finding that when firms compete by adopting simple pricing algorithms that are linear
in rivals’ prices, thus making short-run commitments, conjectural variation equilibria can arise with
prices that exceed those arising in static Nash equilibria when firms choose price).
63 These firms employ “Markov strategies”: they base their decisions on the current state of the
world only. Bygones are bygones: decisions do not depend on what rivals did in the past, except insofar
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Jean Tirole ﬁnd that oligopolists will sustain high prices when each ﬁrm
correctly expects that if it cuts its price, its rival will cut price too. That
expectation dilutes the beneﬁt from such discounting.64 Maskin and Tirole
analyze these simple price-cutting reactions as natural responses in the
competitive environment (hence nonpurposive conduct), as distinct from
eﬀorts to deter, reward, or punish rivals (which would be purposive conduct).
In their analysis, “cutting one’s own price in response to another ﬁrm’s price
cut is not carrying out a threat at all. It is merely an act of self-defense, an
attempt to regain lost customers.” Put by Maskin and Tirole in another way,
“the reaction is a response only to the other ﬁrm’s price cut and not to earlier
history or to one’s own past prices.”65
To help clarify the distinction between purposive and nonpurposive
oligopoly conduct, suppose we have access to documents, emails, and
testimony from the ﬁrms in an oligopoly. If the evidence shows that
executives consider how rivals would respond when choosing key decision
variables like prices and output, that suggests that ﬁrm conduct is strategic
without distinguishing between purposive and nonpurposive conduct.
Suppose, further, that we can query the executives at one ﬁrm candidly about
what they think rivals would do were their ﬁrm to, for example, lower price,
and learn that they expect rivals to lower prices in response. If that
expectation discourages the ﬁrst ﬁrm from cutting price in the ﬁrst place,
keeping prices high, the outcome is coordinated.
Whether we would characterize the strategic conduct as purposive or
nonpurposive depends in part on its rationale. 66 If, for example, the
as those past actions objectively affect the current competitive environment. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole
have explained that “Markov strategies seem at times to accord better with the customary conception of
a reaction in the informal industrial organization literature than do, say, the reactions emphasized in the
repeated game (or ‘supergame’) tradition.” Maskin & Tirole, supra note 58, at 553.
64 The ﬁrms do not necessarily expect their rivals also to match if they raise price. Such
asymmetric reactions are sometimes termed “kinked demand” strategies, although though ﬁrmspeciﬁc demand curves in the models are not necessarily kinked: more elastic with respect to price
increases than with respect to price declines.
65 Maskin & Tirole, supra note 58, at 553. Maskin and Tirole also show that in a continuous
model this behavior is a limiting case of the outcome of ﬁnite-horizon versions of their game, which
we can interpret as showing that the behavior is essentially the result of recursion from Stackelbergtype nonstrategic responses. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III: Cournot
Competition, 31 EUR. ECON. REV. 947, 958 (1987). Zach Brown and Alexander MacKay developed
another model of nonpurposive coordination. They suppose that ﬁrms compete by selecting simple
pricing algorithms that are linear in rivals’ prices and that those choices of algorithms are themselves
made nonstrategically. The “resulting game resembles competition with conjectural variations” and
leads to coordinated outcomes, with prices that exceed those generated in static Nash-Bertrand
models. Brown & MacKay, supra note 62, at 3 n.5.
66 See supra notes 15 and 17 (describing features of strategic conduct that may suggest it is
purposive). Some forms of conduct may be hard to classify, however. See, e.g., supra note 15
(providing an example in which price-leadership could be purposive or nonpurposive).
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executives, still speaking candidly, expect rivals to match simply because they
would lose too many customers if they kept their price high, then the strategic
conduct may be nonpurposive. If instead, for example, they expect rivals to
match because the rivals think that doing so will make price-cutting less
proﬁtable for the ﬁrst ﬁrm, then the strategic conduct may be purposive.67
Or we might ask a ﬁrm’s executives why their own ﬁrm matches when
rival ﬁrms cut prices. If the executives say, for example, “we need to maintain
our policy of always matching rivals’ prices (regardless of whether it would
seem to make business sense)”68 or “we want to send a signal that we would
like to avoid a price war,” the strategic conduct may be purposive.69 However,
if they say, “we see that the overall industry price level has declined, and will
lose many customers unless we reduce price in response” or “we see that our
rivals have reduced their excess production capacity, making it likely that they
will not expand output much when we reduce our output,” the strategic
conduct may be nonpurposive.
As previously mentioned, purposive and nonpurposive conduct may
coexist. Therefore, identifying one type of strategic conduct does not
preclude the possibility that the oligopolists are also engaged in the other. If
conduct is strategic, whether purposive or nonpurposive, and, in addition,
prices exceed a coordination-free benchmark level, we would describe the
outcome as coordinated.
C. Summary
Empirical studies, experimental results, real-world examples, and
economic theory consistently indicates that oligopolies can sustain
coordinated outcomes that restrict competition and yield higher prices and
other harms to buyers. While coordination is not ubiquitous in oligopoly
markets, it often arises, it does not require express collusion, and it need not
be perfect (joint proﬁt-maximizing). Oligopolistic coordination—whether
joint proﬁt-maximizing or, more likely, imperfect or incomplete relative to

67 In terms of Thomas Schelling’s distinction, described supra note 15, communication of the
ﬁrst expectation (nonpurposive conduct) would be a warning while communication of the second
(purposive conduct) would be a threat, at least if the rivals interpreted the intention to match as a
credible commitment.
68 Similarly, if the ﬁrm had made a contractual or public commitment to match its rivals’ prices,
that may suggest its price-matching conduct is purposive.
69 If a ﬁrm systematically responds to the loss of a customer to a speciﬁc rival by oﬀering low
prices to the rival’s largest customer (but not oﬀering discounts to other prospective customers),
that behavior too might suggest that strategic conduct is purposive, as it appears not to make
business sense other than through disciplining the rival’s conduct. See supra notes 15 and 17
(describing features of strategic conduct that may suggest it is purposive).
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monopoly outcomes—is a serious problem and thus an appropriate concern
of antitrust enforcement.
II. THE DUBIOUS ARGUMENT FOR SKEPTICISM ABOUT OLIGOPOLY
COORDINATION
In contrast to the above, an inﬂuential strand of antitrust thinking
associated with the Chicago school of antitrust views oligopolies benignly.
According to Robert Bork, “[o]ligopolistic structures probably do not lead to
signiﬁcant restrictions of output,”70 and “non-collusive oligopolistic behavior,
to the extent that it exists at all (and I am not persuaded that such behavior
occurs outside of economics textbooks), rarely results in any signiﬁcant ability
to restrict output.”71 To similar eﬀect, Richard Posner argued that cartels are
“usually quite unstable” 72 and that outside of the most concentrated
oligopolies, the “immense practical diﬃculties” oligopolists face in reaching
cartel prices and the problem of maintaining a cartel “in the face of the
inevitable self-destructive tendencies” cannot be solved without “the kind of
elaborate apparatus of communication and enforcement that is bound to be
detected eventually.”73
According to such Chicagoans, antitrust should have little concern with
oligopoly, outside of prosecuting express agreements to ﬁx prices or divide
markets or challenging mergers to near-monopoly, because oligopolies usually
perform competitively absent express collusion and express collusion is
diﬃcult. This argument relies on three claims, each highly questionable.
The ﬁrst claim is that absent coordination, oligopolies perform
competitively. Even if “coordination” were interpreted broadly, as we do (but
the Chicagoans may not), this claim ignores the modern economic learning
and antitrust experience with unilateral eﬀects: even absent coordination,74

ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 196 (1978).
Id. at 221. Consistent with this analysis, Bork also contended that horizontal mergers in
oligopoly markets are unlikely to be harmful unless the merger is to monopoly or near monopoly.
Id. Bork used the term “collusive” to refer to express naked horizontal cartels (price-ﬁxing or market
division), id. at 263-79, not to refer to the broader concept of coordination we employ.
72 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 53 (1st ed. 1976).
73 Id. at 54. As does Bork, Posner supposes that oligopolies either compete or collude (either
expressly or tacitly). Id. at 40, 47. In the second edition of his book, Posner revised his exposition but
continued to question whether oligopolies would succeed in avoiding competition, particularly in
markets with more than a few sellers. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 68-69 (2d ed. 2001).
74 We are referring to static Nash equilibrium when ﬁrms choose price or output. When
oligopolists are behaving nonstrategically, their prices could be elevated above their costs. We treat
such prices as our noncoordination benchmark, not as the outcome of coordinated conduct.
70
71
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oligopoly performance is generally imperfect and can often become
substantially worse with horizontal mergers well short of a monopoly.75
The Chicagoans’ second claim is that coordinated outcomes from
nonpurposive strategic conduct can simply be ignored.76 When Donald Turner
described oligopoly outcomes, he had nonpurposive conduct in mind.77 Yet
Richard Posner, criticizing Turner’s views from a Chicago perspective, appears
to take as given that Turner is describing purposive conduct.78 This claim is
the likely basis for the Chicagoan understanding of “tacit collusion” as express
collusion demonstrated by circumstantial evidence.79
The third claim is that purposive strategic conduct, including illegal
collusion, is diﬃcult, risky, and unstable—and therefore rare. Proponents of
this view reference genuine challenges in achieving coordinated outcomes
through purposive strategic conduct but overstate how diﬃcult those
challenges are to surmount.
The challenges may include overcoming possible diﬀerences in incentives
among oligopolists, short-run incentives to cheat on the coordinated
outcome, diﬃculties in diagnosing which ﬁrm (if any) has done so, and
incentives to shy away from imposing costly punishments. These and similar
factors can indeed limit how widespread and eﬀective purposive coordination
is. But, modern theoretical literature analyzes these challenges and ﬁnds that
coordinated outcomes from purposive conduct can often be achieved and
sustained, 80 and empirical, real-world, and experimental evidence
demonstrates that coordination is often feasible and durable. 81 Modern
75 The theoretical economic literature that analyzes the Nash equilibria of static models
prominently highlights the Bertrand paradox, by which even as few as two ﬁrms will reach an
equilibrium where price is equal to cost. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 209-11 (1988) (discussing the Bertrand paradox). This outcome is the Nash
equilibrium of a static oligopoly model in which homogeneous ﬁrms have identical and constant
unit costs, and price is the decision variable. The Bertrand paradox is called a paradox “because it is
hard to believe that ﬁrms in industries with few ﬁrms never succeed in manipulating the market
price to make proﬁts.” Id. at 210-11. The theoretical literature analyzing the Nash equilibria of static
models also prominently discusses the Cournot model and the Bertrand model with product
diﬀerentiation—each of which shows how static oligopoly interaction can elevate price above cost
when a small change in a ﬁrm’s decision variable in the direction of increased competition would
not divert all sales to that ﬁrm.
76 See Posner, supra note 21, at 1569 (indicating Posner’s “doubts that the interdependence
theory of oligopoly provides an adequate explanation as to why prices in oligopolistic industries
should exceed competitive levels”).
77 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
78 See Posner, supra note 21, at 1566-69 (arguing that Turner does not adequately account for
oligopolists’ incentives to undermine coordination through cheating). Posner acknowledges a
collaboration with Aaron Director and a great debt to George Stigler, both of whom, like Posner,
are associated with the Chicago school. Id. at 1562 n.*.
79 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
81 See supra Section I.A.
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economics thus accepts that a broad range of outcomes are possible in
oligopoly markets—prominently including coordinated outcomes.
Overstated obstacles to coordination arising from purposive conduct
include the following:
(1) Explicit communication (talking) is vulnerable to detection and prosecution
by antitrust enforcers.82 Talking may indeed make coordination easier, but it is
not always detectable by enforcers and not always necessary for oligopolists
to reach coordinated outcomes through purposive conduct. Consensus terms
of coordination can be reached without communication when there are other
ways to make an outcome focal, as through leader-follower conduct or market
allocation based, for example, on historical patterns.
(2) Oligopolists’ divergent interests make it hard for them to reach consensus
terms, especially without talking. Divergent interests can indeed pose a challenge
for oligopolists seeking to reach terms of coordination, especially when the
number of ﬁrms rises and ﬁrms compete on multiple dimensions.83 But there
is no reason to think that this challenge is routinely or reliably prohibitive.
For example, oligopolists can simplify coordination tasks, as by standardizing
product dimensions or grandfathering in prior price diﬀerentials; or, they
may instead attempt to minimize competition through means such as market
division or reciprocal royalties rather than price-ﬁxing.84
(3) Successful coordination may require oligopolists to reach consensus on the
terms and enforcement of planned punishment strategies, as well as reach consensus on
the intended high prices and individual firm outputs. If oligopolists adopted the
complex “optimal punishment schemes” identified in the theoretical economics
literature, they would indeed often need to engage in such negotiations. But
coordination can often be sustained with simple threats or punishment
schemes, including simply jeopardizing the profitable coordination, that can be
identified without detailed (or perhaps any) communication.85
See supra note 41.
GAVIL ET AL., supra note 28, at 296-97.
See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
The early experimental literature on cooperation in repeated prisoners’ dilemmas found that
strategies that combined being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear had particular success in eliciting
long-term cooperation. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 54 (1984). The
most notable example was the simple “TIT FOR TAT” algorithm, which cooperates on the ﬁrst
move and practices reciprocity for both cooperation and defection thereafter. Id. at 118; cf. WILLIAM
POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 106-18 (1992) (describing an early experiment in which two
economists playing a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game induced trust and achieved some
cooperation). Moreover, the early game theoretic literature on collusion found that fear of reversion
to static Nash behavior—a natural result of a coordinated consensus breaking down—is often
suﬃcient to deter cheating. Indeed, antitrust practitioners often center their analyses on that
possibility rather than on more sophisticated punishment schemes. Joseph Harrington has observed
that “cartels occur most frequently in markets for which buyers’ decisions are heavily based on price.”
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
82
83
84
85
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(4) Even after reaching consensus, firms are likely to cheat on it, especially when
firms can find ways to do so that delay or avoid detection. Proponents of this view
rely on George Stigler’s observation that even firms with few rivals could have
strong incentives to undercut collusive prices, leading to competitive
outcomes.86 Short-term incentives to cheat on the consensus do indeed create a
constraint or challenge for collusion, but this challenge can be overcome—as is
evident from the prevalence and durability of cartels, the theoretical economic
literature showing that collusion can persist even with dozens or hundreds of
rivals and even with severe difficulties in identifying defection and defectors,
and the theoretical and empirical studies showing how firms can achieve
coordinated outcomes through purposive conduct in the face of uncertainty
about rival behavior or difficulty monitoring that behavior on all competitive
dimensions.87 Firms may also be able to improve detection and responses to
cheating through openly adopted practices like product standardization, posting
prices, or contractual commitments to match rivals’ prices.88
Despite its reliance on these questionable premises, the Chicagoan benign
view of oligopolies has circumscribed the range of antitrust enforcement. It
has led the enforcement agencies (whether based on their own judgment or
on their expectations of courts’ beliefs) to relax (i.e., increase over time) the
concentration threshold above which horizontal mergers would be closely
scrutinized and/or likely challenged.89
Thoughts on Why Certain Markets Are More Susceptible to Collusion and Some Policy Suggestions for
Dealing With Them, at 6, OECD doc. DAF/COMP/GF(2015)8 (Oct. 19, 2015),
http://www.oecd.org/oﬃcialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF(2015)8
&docLanguage=En [https://perma.cc/TUS5-76FH]. If static Nash behavior in such markets is very
competitive, as simple oligopoly models with prices as decision variables suggest, then reversion to
static Nash behavior could support substantial price elevation in a supergame model, because in
those models the degree of cooperation is limited by the strength of the incentive to avoid breakdown
of cooperation. By contrast, the complex “optimal punishment schemes” that game theorists have
analyzed would likely require communication to implement. On the design of optimal punishment
schemes, see generally Dilip Abreu, On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting, 56
ECONOMETRICA 383 (1988).
86 See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 46 (1964) (highlighting
oligopolists’ incentive to cheat on a collusive outcome through secret price-cutting, while recognizing
that under some circumstances, coordination could succeed). Richard Posner explicitly acknowledged
the influence of Stigler’s model on his views. POSNER, supra note 72, at 47.
87 See supra notes 37–43, 49–50 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. To similar eﬀect, when distributors or buyers of
intermediate goods from multiple sources tell suppliers about discounts received from rival
suppliers—which is often a natural negotiating tactic—they can facilitate (purposive) supplier
coordination by speeding the detection and response to cheating. More generally, ﬁrms can deter
cheating, thereby facilitating coordination, by increasing the transparency of what otherwise might
be secret transactions.
89 The threshold above which acquisitions would be scrutinized strictly “involved a reduction
of the number of signiﬁcant competitors in the following manner: 1960s (12 to 11), 1970s (9 to 8),
1980s (6 to 5), 1990s (4 to 3), 2000s (4 to 3).” William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition
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The Chicago perspective also led the Supreme Court in Brooke Group to
take the view that oligopoly coordination is hard to achieve and unstable.90
The Court explained, seeming to focus on purposive but not explicit
coordination, that the “anticompetitive minuet” of raising prices through
signaling “is most diﬃcult to compose and to perform, even for a disciplined
oligopoly” because signals “are a blunt and imprecise means of ensuring
smooth cooperation, especially in the context of changing or unprecedented
market circumstances.”91 In addition, according to the Court, there is a “high
likelihood that any attempt to discipline will produce an outbreak of
competition.”92 Moreover, the details of the Supreme Court’s explanation of
why the industry was not congenial to coordination “has a distinctly Chicago
ﬂavor” not informed by insights from modern oligopoly theory. 93 While
modern courts accept the possibility of oligopolistic coordination, and are
willing to ﬁnd competitive harm from conduct in highly concentrated
markets, 94 they may nevertheless be led by Brooke Group to interpret the

Policy: The Case of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129, 143 (2009).
Data released by the Federal Trade Commission about the disposition of horizontal merger
investigations subject to “second requests” between 1996 and 2011 suggest that the likelihood of a
challenge rises as (the Commission’s view of) the number of signiﬁcant rivals falls, and that a
challenge becomes more likely than not when the acquisition reduces the number of signiﬁcant rivals
from 5 to 4. FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER INVESTIGATION DATA: FISCAL
YEARS 1996–2011 12 tbl.4.1 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/
reports/horizontal-merger-investigation-data-ﬁscal-years-1996-2011/130104horizontalmergerreport.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JL5U-N2HN]. The likelihood of FTC enforcement when concentration is
below this threshold has declined over time. JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND
REMEDIES 24-33 (2015). The Justice Department likely behaves similarly to the FTC, but the
former has not released comparable data.
90 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227-28, 240 (1993).
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court was wrong to suppose that the plaintiﬀ “had the
burden of proving either the actuality of supracompetitive pricing, or the actuality of tacit collusion.”
Id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 227-28. The Court distinguished this conduct from “express coordination.” Id. at 227.
Justice Stevens responded by taking a broader view of coordination, more consistent with ours. Id.
at 257 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I would suppose . . . that the professional performers who had
danced the minuet for 40 to 50 years would be better able to predict whether their favorite partners
would follow them in the future than would an outsider, who might not know the diﬀerence between
Haydn and Mozart.”).
92 Id. at 228.
93 Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 600 (1994).
94 See, e.g., FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (enjoining a merger
reducing the number of major ﬁrms three to two on a coordinated-eﬀects theory); United States v.
H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); see also In re Text Messaging Antitrust
Litigation, 782 F.3d 867, 873-74 (7th Cir. 2015) (accepting that the oligopolists coordinated through
leader-follower pricing but declining to infer an agreement among them in violation of the Sherman
Act from circumstantial evidence).
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evidence against the background of the Chicagoan presumption that
oligopolies would be expected to compete strongly.95
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST MERGER ENFORCEMENT
Notwithstanding the important prophylactic role of merger enforcement,
in preventing coordinated eﬀects that would be diﬃcult to challenge under
the antitrust laws after the fact, and notwithstanding developments in
economic thinking that we have highlighted, coordination has received less
attention in antitrust since the 1980s outside of cartel enforcement.96 This is
evident in the way courts review mergers between rival hospitals. In an
inﬂuential 1986 opinion upholding an FTC decision blocking a hospital
merger, Judge Richard Posner explained that the “ultimate issue” in a
horizontal merger case is “whether the challenged acquisition is likely to
facilitate collusion.” 97 By contrast, in recent hospital merger cases, the
primary if not sole competitive eﬀects concern was with unilateral eﬀects.98

95 While the Court’s skepticism about the success of coordination in Brooke Group was oﬀered
as a reason not to expect oligopoly recoupment after predatory pricing, it has been understood more
broadly. For example, the dissenting judges in the closely divided circuit court in Blomkest Fertilizer,
Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), relied in part on Brooke Group when
explaining that higher than competitive prices were implausible in an oligopoly absent an express
agreement among rivals because coordination is diﬃcult to achieve and sustain. Id. at 1041-42.
96 Although it is not the focus of our analysis, we note that the courts have also made it more
diﬃcult to use Section 1 of the Sherman Act to challenge coordinated oligopoly outcomes. In 1986,
the Supreme Court encouraged lower courts to consider the economic plausibility of allegations of
conspiracy before inferring a horizontal agreement from circumstantial evidence and reject cases
where the plaintiﬀ cannot proﬀer evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility” of unilateral
conduct. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 596-98 (1986).
Although the alleged agreement involved a conspiracy to set prices below cost, a number of lower
courts have applied Matsushita’s standards in cases involving alleged agreements to raise price. GAVIL
ET AL., supra note 28, at 338. Matsushita’s call for an assessment of the economic plausibility of
plaintiﬀ ’s conspiracy evidence at the summary judgment stage of litigation has since been extended
to the pleading stage of litigation. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-60 (2007).
Since Matsushita, courts have commonly considered economic plausibility when deciding whether
to infer an agreement from circumstantial evidence. E.g., Stanislaus Food Products Co. v. USSPOSCO Indus., 803 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the alleged conspiracy is
economically implausible because the “beneﬁt of this scheme [to a critical alleged coconspirator] . . . is just not apparent”); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc., 203 F.3d at 1043-44 (noting
“situational [plus] factors” including “market structure, motivation, and opportunity” that “make
conspiracy possible”). With courts willing to accept dubious Chicagoan arguments skeptical that
oligopolies can successfully reach coordinated outcomes, this seemingly neutral economic approach
has in practice empowered defendants opposing meritorious coordination cases by giving them an
opportunity they did not previously possess to press the arguments that persuaded the Chicagoans
that coordinated oligopoly outcomes are hard to reach and sustain.
97 Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
98 E.g., ProMedica Health Sys. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 568-70 (6th Cir. 2014) (analyzing the
unilateral effects of a merger between two hospitals in Ohio); Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc.

2008

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1985

Coordinated eﬀects of horizontal mergers have also been downplayed by
the antitrust enforcement agencies. The agencies often focus on unilateral
eﬀects even in industries, such as airlines, with histories of coordinated
outcomes. 99 We follow the widespread convention of classifying as a
unilateral eﬀect the possibility that all ﬁrms’ prices change—provided that
none of the changes turn on the expected responses of rivals.100
But the merger guidelines have evolved to reﬂect the changing economic
understanding of coordination since the courts and enforcement agencies
adopted Chicago school views. The 1982 Merger Guidelines were predicated
on a Chicagoan view of oligopolistic coordination. 101 By contrast, the
analytical framework governing coordinated eﬀects set forth in the 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines was rooted in the modern economics of
coordination through purposive conduct,102 and the 2010 Horizontal Merger

v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 786-87 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing the post-merger entity’s
power to negotiate higher rates of reimbursement and charge higher rates for ancillary services).
99 Baker, supra note 7, at 116-17. In part, this likely reﬂects a shift in agency focus to unilateral
eﬀects. Unilateral eﬀects became attractive in part because they gave the enforcement agencies a
greater ability to understand and explain the mechanism by which competition would be harmed
and because economists developed new empirical tools for analyzing unilateral eﬀects that took
advantage of new sources of data. Jonathan B. Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace
Unilateral Eﬀects?, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31, 33-36 (2003).
100 To address an often-confusing technical question, unilateral price increases can include
nonstrategic responses of nonmerging rivals (such as price increases). In some common models used
to simulate unilateral eﬀects, notably static Nash equilibrium models where ﬁrms choose price or
output, ﬁrms act as though they anticipate that rivals will not respond to their decisions but will
react rationally to the fact of the merger, so nonmerging ﬁrms’ choices typically will change. We
treat those eﬀects of a merger in such Nash equilibrium models as our noncoordinated benchmark,
and would classify those responses as unilateral, not coordinated. Unilateral eﬀects do not assume
that nonmerging ﬁrms’ prices (or outputs) remain constant, but they do assume that those ﬁrms
pursue “unchanging strategies,” meaning roughly that each nonmerging ﬁrm’s price bears the same
relationship to others’ (including the merging ﬁrms’) prices as it would have done absent the merger.
See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Eﬀects of Horizontal Mergers, in
HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 43, 43 (Paolo Buccirossi, ed. 2008) (suggesting that
merger eﬀects are “coordinated” only if they shift the (confusingly named) “reaction functions” of
nonmerging parties, and using the language of “unilateral eﬀects” to describe the outcome when
nonmerging rivals respond to an anticipated price increase by the merged ﬁrm by raising price too,
so long as the nonmerging ﬁrms pursue “unchanging strategies”).
101 Paul T. Denis, Market Power in Antitrust Merger Analysis: Refining the Collusion Hypothesis, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 829, 829-30 (1992). Cf. William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman’s
View, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 618, 626 (1983) (acknowledging the inﬂuence of Stigler’s analysis of
oligopolies in the development of concentration standards).
102 1992 HMG, supra note 14, at 18-22. More specifically, the discussion of coordinated effects in
the 1992 Guidelines was based on the idea that coordinated outcomes were those subgame perfect
equilibria of infinitely repeated games that are less competitive than static oligopoly outcomes. See
Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS, 1991, at 281, 291-92; Baker, supra note 7, at 152 n.16.
These articles were written around the time that those authors worked on drafting the 1992 Guidelines.
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Guidelines broadened the deﬁnition of coordinated eﬀects further to
incorporate nonpurposive strategic (“parallel accommodating”) conduct.103
How should antitrust enforcers and courts address coordination when
evaluating horizontal mergers in light of the modern economic literature?
Here, we suggest that a detailed competitive eﬀects analysis should turn on
whether the coordinated eﬀects concern principally involves purposive or
nonpurposive strategic conduct. Enforcers should, of course, be open to both
concerns, which are not mutually exclusive.104
We emphasize, however, that both types of strategic conduct and resulting
coordinated eﬀects can be expected to be more likely or more substantial the
greater the level and increase in market concentration. This supports a
structural merger policy, by which market concentration statistics trigger a
presumption of coordinated eﬀects—while also suggesting more detailed
ways of evaluating the likelihood of coordinated eﬀects in the event the
plaintiﬀ ’s prima facie case based on concentration is not strong or successfully
questioned by the merging ﬁrm defendants.105
A. Coordinated Eﬀects Involving Purposive Strategic Conduct
In considering whether a merger would facilitate more eﬀective purposive
strategic conduct, we recommend that enforcers and courts look to identify
mergers that weaken a constraint on the ability of coordinating ﬁrms to
approach more closely the joint proﬁt-maximizing outcome or make
coordination more likely or more stable. This approach is suggested by
103 2010 HMG, supra note 13, at 24-25 (identifying as “coordinated” eﬀects conduct that is
proﬁtable only because of rival reactions, as in the 1992 Guidelines, while explicitly incorporating
“parallel accommodating conduct” within that deﬁnition and distinguishing it from a “common
understanding that is not explicitly negotiated but would be enforced by the detection and
punishment of deviations that would undermine the coordinated interaction”); see Carl Shapiro,
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. For Econ., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the ABA
Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum: Update from the Antitrust Division27-28 (Nov. 18, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/ﬁle/518246/download [https://perma.cc/ASZ6-C9KS] (explaining that
the 2010 Merger Guidelines recognize parallel accommodating conduct as a form of coordination
and providing an example).
104 See supra note 18. For example, if pre-merger ﬁrms have reached coordinated outcomes
short of joint proﬁt-maximization through nonpurposive conduct, their merger could potentially
facilitate purposive coordination (as well as make nonpurposive coordination more eﬀective).
105 Once the plaintiff has satisfied its initial burden of production in a horizontal merger case, the
strength of defendants’ practical burden of persuasion varies on a sliding scale. “The more compelling
the prima facie case,” which could be satisfied by relying on a presumption of competitive harm inferred
from market concentration, “the more evidence the defendant must present to rebut it successfully.”
United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Accord FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.,
246 F.3d 708, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2001). One district court has interpreted this language to mean that as the
plaintiff ’s prima facie case becomes more compelling, the defendant must show more to meet its burden
of production (not just that the defendant must show more to meet its practical burden of persuasion).
United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2011).
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economic models in which ﬁrms seek to approach that outcome (or another
anticompetitive outcome) but are constrained in that attempt because they
must reach consensus terms of coordination and deter cheating.106 In such
models, coordination is constrained either by limitations on the incentive of
coordinating ﬁrms to punish cheating or by the diﬃculties they face in
identifying coordinated outcomes that would increase the pool of proﬁts from
exercising market power without reducing the proﬁts obtained by any one of
those ﬁrms. This approach allows the plaintiﬀ to explain, and the court to
understand, why the merger matters—and not simply to look to the structural
presumption that associates higher concentration with greater odds of
successful purposive coordination.
Suppose, for example, that all ﬁrms sell a single product so
interchangeable that one way or another all will charge the identical price.
Thus, in practice, coordinating ﬁrms can improve the terms of coordination
only by raising that price.107 All the ﬁrms would like the industry price to rise
to some extent, but the high-price point that a ﬁrm would select—the highest
the ﬁrm would want the uniform price to go before it would do better by
cheating rather than going along with its rivals—would diﬀer from ﬁrm to
ﬁrm. A ﬁrm with a small market share and a greater ability to expand output
inexpensively might prefer to cheat rather than accept the higher industry
price that a ﬁrm with a high share and a high cost of expanding output would
prefer the industry to adopt.
In equilibrium, the coordinated price would be the lowest of those highprice points: the lowest price that any individual ﬁrm would accept if it knew
that its rivals would charge the identical price. The constraint on coordination
would be the incentive of the ﬁrm M (for “maverick”) that prefers the lowest
coordinated industry price not to raise the industry price further. If following
a merger between ﬁrm M and a rival the merged ﬁrm prefers a higher price
than did pre-merger ﬁrm M, that will relax the constraint on coordination
previously imposed by ﬁrm M, leading prices to rise.
In consequence, courts and enforcers should be concerned particularly
about the coordination-enhancing potential of mergers that involve a
maverick in an industry where coordination through purposive conduct is

106 More technically, we are working within the economic framework of oligopoly repeated
games as it is usually interpreted in antitrust economics, although in pure game theory there is no
assumption that players seek any particular outcome.
107 This simplifying assumption, made for expositional convenience, rules out the possibility
that the ﬁrms would, for example, choose diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent ﬁrms, or pay high cost ﬁrms
to reduce output more than low cost ﬁrms. Nothing of consequence in the example would change if
prices diﬀered across ﬁrms, perhaps reﬂecting diﬀerences in product quality, and the ﬁrms preserved
those price diﬀerences when increasing their prices.
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ongoing or appears feasible.108 Although the term “maverick” has been used
loosely, confusing the district court in H&R Block,109 we refer to a setting in
which ﬁrms would cheat by cutting its price to below the coordinated price.
In this setting, a maverick is a ﬁrm that is most apt to be the binding
constraint on coordination, as by being nearly indiﬀerent between going
along with a high coordinated price and cheating on that price.110 In the above
example, the maverick is the ﬁrm that prefers the lowest coordinated price
and will keep the coordinated price from increasing further simply by
refusing to go along. As the example suggests, a merger involving a maverick
may relax the maverick’s constraint on the eﬀectiveness of industry
coordination, leading to higher prices.
A maverick, according to our deﬁnition, can be identiﬁed in a number of
ways.111 For example, a ﬁrm is likely to be considered a maverick if it has
actually declined to go along with recent attempts by others to raise the
coordinated price. 112 If other ﬁrms foresee such behavior, they may avoid
attempts to raise the price. 113 A maverick may be identiﬁed by structural
features that make it less willing than its rivals to go along with more
ambitious coordination, such as a small share and substantial ability to expand
output inexpensively.114 A maverick could also be identiﬁed when industry
prices respond to factors that aﬀect its own marginal costs but not the costs

108 See generally, Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated
Competitive Eﬀects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135 (2002) (explaining how
coordinated competitive eﬀects analysis can be reconstructed around the role of a maverick ﬁrm that
constrains prices when industry coordination is incomplete). For enforcement examples see, e.g.,
Complaint, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBEV SA/NV (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 13-00127); FCC
Staﬀ Analysis and Findings, In re Applications of AT&T, Inc. & Deutsche Telekom AG, WT Docket
No. 11–65 (Nov. 29, 2011).
109 H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 79-80. The court rejected the term as confusing but
nevertheless found anticompetitive coordinated eﬀects on the ground that the merger involved the
acquisition of a ﬁrm that played the role of a maverick by our deﬁnition. Id.
110 It is also possible that ﬁrms would deviate by declining to punish cheating rivals (cheating
on the “punishment state”). Then a maverick would be nearly indiﬀerent to participating in the
punishment of cheaters.
111 Others employ the term maverick more broadly to also include a ﬁrm that competes more
aggressively than its rivals, including when oligopolists are not coordinating through repeated
interaction. See, e.g., John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Private Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with NonCournot and Maverick Behavior, 7 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 403, 410 (1989) (describing maverick ﬁrms
as those ﬁrms with “a particularly small conjectural variation, causing output expansiveness in its
industry” or a ﬁrm “whose demise results in an increase in the remaining ﬁrms’ conjectural
variations”) (emphasis omitted).
112 See Baker, supra note 108, at 174 (describing behaviors associated with maverick ﬁrms).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 175-76.
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of its rivals. 115 Diﬀerent ﬁrms can be mavericks at diﬀerent times or on
diﬀerent competitive dimensions.116
The potential for a merger involving a maverick to enhance oligopoly
coordination links growing concentration from the reduction in the number
of signiﬁcant rivals with competitive harm. The odds that a randomly selected
merger among market participants involves a maverick increase as the number
of signiﬁcant rivals falls—and even that calculation would understate the
likelihood given the incentive of ﬁrms to make acquisitions that facilitate
coordination.117 This link supports a structural presumption of coordinated
harm from horizontal mergers when strategic conduct is purposive.118
B. Coordinated Eﬀects Involving Nonpurposive Strategic Conduct
A merger could also create coordinated effects, and therefore harm
competition, by affecting nonpurposive strategic conduct. If, as a result of a
merger, oligopolists engaging in nonpurposive strategic conduct change their
expectations of the way their rivals will naturally or predictably respond in
the competitive and market environment, the coordinated outcome can
change. Coordinated effects arise when the new coordinated outcome is
worse for buyers.
In order to explain how a merger can create coordinated eﬀects when
strategic conduct is nonpurposive, we distinguish two ways that rivals may
naturally respond, which we term reinforcing and diluting. We say that rivals’
reactions in the industry are “reinforcing” when they go in the same direction
(e.g., rivals’ reactions to a price cut generally involve price cuts) and
“diluting” when they go in opposite directions (e.g., rivals’ reactions to a
115 Id. at 174-75 (describing how the market price will change if a maverick ﬁrm’s marginal costs
rise or fall).
116 When challenging the US Airways/American merger, the government alleged that the
merger would enhance coordination on two diﬀerent dimensions: with US Airways a maverick on
one dimension (involving discounted connecting fares) and American a maverick on the other
(involving aggregate capacity). See Amended Complaint at 17-19, 26, United States v. U.S. Airways
Grp., Inc. (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-01236) (describing US Airways as oﬀering connecting service at
a substantial discount to the nonstop service of other airlines on the same routes, while other airlines
generally do not undercut the nonstop fares of their rivals, and describing American’s standalone
expansion plan as undermining the industry’s capacity discipline).
117 See Baker, supra note 108, at 198 (“[T]he fewer the number of signiﬁcant sellers, the more
likely it is that the loss of any one would be the loss of a ﬁrm that constrains coordinated conduct.”).
118 While we have emphasized the way increased concentration or the loss of a maverick from
merger enhance the prospects for purposive coordination, they are not the only way mergers can make
purposive coordination more likely or more effective. Mergers may also do so by making it easier to
identify terms of coordination or increasing the speed or extent of punishments for cheating, for
example by increasing the transparency of prices or increasing symmetry among firms. See supra notes
35 and 88 and accompanying text. Factors such as these may facilitate the exercise of purposive
coordination even when firms were coordinating nonpurposively before the merger. See supra note 104.
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capacity increase generally involve capacity reductions). 119 As our
hypothetical examples will demonstrate, a merger will create an adverse
coordinated eﬀect when strategic conduct is nonpurposive and the merger
would be expected to strengthen reinforcing reactions or weaken diluting
reactions. The examples suggest market features that courts and enforcers
could look for to identify mergers with coordination-enhancing potential. But
the analysis of coordinated eﬀects of mergers involving nonpurposive
strategic conduct is in its infancy, and we expect that more such possibilities
will become evident over time.
1. Reinforcing Reactions
When the relevant reactions are reinforcing, competitive harm would be
expected if the merger strengthens those reactions by making them sharper,
more prompt, or more likely. Suppose that price reactions are reinforcing: a
ﬁrm contemplating a price cut expects its rivals to cut their prices in response
and a ﬁrm contemplating a price increase expects its rivals to respond by
raising their prices. It is plausible that the expectation of reinforcing reactions
will discourage the ﬁrm from reducing prices and encourage it to increase
prices. A merger that makes those reactions stronger or more certain will tend
to harm buyers. As such, a merger will more strongly discourage price
reductions and more strongly encourage price increases.
We think it is often plausible that a horizontal merger will strengthen
reinforcing nonpurposive reactions. The merged firm is necessarily a larger part
of its rivals’ competitive environment than were the merging parties before the
merger. In an industry with four comparably significant firms, for example, any
one firm might cut its price with the expectation that, for each of the other
three, the competitive environment would remain predominantly as it was
before the price cut, limiting those rivals’ natural and predictable reinforcing
responses. That expectation could change with a merger, strengthening their
responses and thereby leading to a higher coordinated price.
To illustrate the way reinforcing reactions can strengthen as the number
of ﬁrms shrink, suppose that in this industry, ﬁrms respond to price changes
by rivals with a lag, and that when a responding ﬁrm adjusts its price, it
matches an average of all other ﬁrms’ prices.120 Then, in a four-ﬁrm industry,
if one ﬁrm lowers its price, it will take several time lags before the other ﬁrms’
119 In the discussion here, we assume (as is the case when prices or capacities are decision
variables) that an increase by one ﬁrm either beneﬁts consumers and harms rivals or vice versa. If
we allowed for a decision variable that has same-sign eﬀects on consumers and rivals, our discussion
would become more cumbersome.
120 See Brown & MacKay, supra note 62, at 1 n.3 (indicating that in practice, pricing algorithms
typically adjust prices based on the average price of a set of competitors).
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prices come into near parity with the ﬁrst mover’s. Meanwhile, the price
cutter will be attracting more customers, who may remain its customers when
price parity is (approximately) restored. Under such circumstances, the ﬁrst
ﬁrm’s price reduction could be proﬁtable. By contrast, if the industry shrinks
to two ﬁrms, and the duopolists employ the same behavioral rule, a price cut
by one ﬁrm would promptly lead its rival to match in full, likely making pricecutting unproﬁtable.
The basic insight from the example does not rely on its speciﬁc behavioral
pattern. The example shows, based on intuitively plausible mechanics, that a
ﬁrm in an industry with a somewhat competitive market structure may expect
its price movements to be only partially matched or matched only with a lag,
while a ﬁrm in a more concentrated industry may expect such matching to be
prompter and fuller. The faster and stronger reactions in the more
concentrated industry would be expected to discourage price-cutting and
encourage price increases.121
This example illustrates how a merger that increases concentration
signiﬁcantly when reactions are reinforcing can lead sellers to hold back from
procompetitive actions for nonpurposive strategic reasons—more precisely,
to hold back more than they did before—thereby harming buyers. As the 2010
Merger Guidelines state,
A market typically is more vulnerable to coordinated conduct if a ﬁrm’s
prospective competitive reward from attracting customers away from its
rivals will be signiﬁcantly diminished by likely responses of those rivals. This
is more likely to be the case, the stronger and faster are the responses the ﬁrm
anticipates from its rivals. The ﬁrm is more likely to anticipate strong
responses if there are few signiﬁcant competitors . . . .122

The insight from the example links expected responses to the level of market
concentration. It thus supports a structural presumption of harm from horizontal
merger when strategic conduct is nonpurposive and reactions are reinforcing.
2. Diluting Reactions
In other industries—for example, ones in which ﬁrms compete primarily
by setting output levels or choosing capacities—it may be reasonable to expect
diluting reactions, not reinforcing ones. 123 Firms contemplating reducing

121 If responses are also more certain in the more concentrated industry, that feature, too, would
be expected to discourage price-cutting and encourage price increases.
122 2010 HMG, supra note 13, at 26.
123 When the reactions in question tend to dilute the initial competitive impact of a change, those
reactions will often make the industry more competitive than a static Nash analysis would predict. A
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output or capacity may be more likely to expect rivals to expand output or
capacity in response rather than to pull back, and ﬁrms increasing capacity
may be more likely to expect rivals to postpone their own capacity increases.
In such an industry, harm may arise if a merger weakens the ﬁrms’ diluting
responses. This might happen for at least two reasons. First, the merged ﬁrm
faces fewer rivals, with less total capacity, than did either pre-merger partner.
Therefore, when deciding whether to cut back its output, the ﬁrm may expect
a more muted output expansion by rivals than before. Second, ordinary
unilateral eﬀects will often reduce the merged ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing
output. If that shift also reduces the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing change in
output in response to a nonmerging ﬁrm’s output reduction (relative to the
aggregate response of the merging ﬁrms prior to the merger), the nonmerging
ﬁrms will anticipate a weaker diluting response to their own output changes
and will thus be encouraged to reduce their output.
For example, consider a merger in an industry with a relatively
homogenous product, where the ﬁrms have ﬁxed capacities and rising
marginal costs of production. The merger of two fairly large rivals would be
expected to create a ﬁrm that has a unilateral incentive to reduce output in
order to increase the industry price. One reason is that the merged ﬁrm would
have a greater base of sales on which to proﬁt from a higher industry price.
A second reason is that the merged ﬁrm would recognize that less industry
capacity is in the hands of other ﬁrms. The acquired ﬁrm’s capacity would no
longer be used to expand output in response to an output reduction by the
merged ﬁrm. Thus, the merged ﬁrm would expect the magnitude of the
aggregate supply response it would face if it were to raise prices would be
reduced (relative to the supply response the merger partners previously
faced). Moreover, that reaction is natural and predictable, so nonmerging
rivals would understand that the merged ﬁrm’s incentives have changed. Each
nonmerging ﬁrm would assume that the merged ﬁrm would not expand
output much, if at all, in the event the nonmerging ﬁrm reduces output,
giving each an incentive to raise price.124 The upshot is that after the merger,
all ﬁrms would have a greater incentive than before to reduce output and
increase prices, making competitive harm from merger likely.125
merger that weakens such reactions will harm competition even if the post-merger industry remains
more competitive than a static Nash analysis (given the post-merger market structure) suggests.
124 In terms of the decomposition proposed by Landes and Posner, the merger in the above
example increases the merged firm’s market power by reducing the elasticity of nonmerging rival
supply. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV.
937, 945 (1981) (explaining that the higher the elasticity of rival supply, the less a firm’s market power).
125 See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement at 1, 9-10, United States v. Int’l Paper Co., No.
1:12–cv–00227 (D.D.C. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f280100/280135.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9J9J-3V5L] (arguing that the merger would result in a loss of competition and thus result
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The example illustrates how a horizontal merger that increases
concentration substantially when reactions are diluting can weaken those
reactions and thus make ﬁrms more willing to accommodate price increases.
Under such circumstances, the ﬁrms would be expected to increase prices.
The example also links a weakening of expected supply responses, and greater
risk of competitive harm, to an increased level of market concentration—
thereby supporting a structural presumption of harm from horizontal mergers
when strategic conduct is nonpurposive and reactions are diluting.
3. Concluding Comments on the Coordinated Eﬀects of Mergers
Just as a horizontal merger could simultaneously create unilateral and
coordinated competitive eﬀects,126 a horizontal merger could simultaneously
create coordinated competitive eﬀects through its eﬀect on both purposive
and nonpurposive conduct. In addition to the familiar eﬀects on purposive
coordination, industry ﬁrms could be led to act less aggressively by
strengthening reinforcing nonpurposive reactions or weakening diluting
nonpurposive reactions. In other cases, though, one coordination theory will
be more plausible than the other or a merger may have opposing eﬀects on
the prospects for coordination through the two types of conduct.127
Our analysis of mergers shows that regardless of whether coordinated
outcomes arise from purposive or nonpurposive strategic conduct, coordination
will often become more likely or more effective as the number of firms in an
industry shrinks. A merger is more likely to involve a maverick, and thereby
enhance coordination, as the number of significant rivals falls.128 Similarly, as
concentration grows, firms will react differently to a larger merged firm’s
strategic moves than they previously did to smaller rivals’ moves—potentially
enhancing coordination by strengthening reinforcing nonpurposive strategic
conduct and weakening diluting nonpurposive strategic conduct. 129
Accordingly, a structural presumption makes sense with respect to both ways
of thinking about strategic conduct and coordinated outcomes.

in higher prices and lower output in the United States by leading the merged ﬁrm to reduce output
strategically and leading nonmerging rivals to respond by increasing prices).
126 E.g., Miller, Sheu & Weinberg, supra note 5, at 29 (identifying both unilateral and
coordinated competitive eﬀects of a horizontal merger through a simulation model).
127 For example, if a merger leads to less competitive reactions, thus enhancing nonpurposive
coordination, and if the most plausible punishment strategies for purposive coordination involve
reversion to the one-shot interaction, the merger could simultaneously reduce the prospects for
purposive coordination by making punishment less severe. To similar eﬀect, if the merger makes
prices more transparent, the merger can facilitate purposive coordination, see supra note 118, and it
may strengthen reinforcing nonpurposive conduct.
128 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
129 See supra Section III.B.
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In our view, the plausibility of persistent coordinated conduct in oligopoly
markets combined with the limitations in the precision of our predictive tools
strengthens the case for a structural merger policy, by which coordinated
eﬀects are presumed when a horizontal merger increases concentration
signiﬁcantly in a concentrated market. Since the structural presumption was
introduced in the 1960s,130 its strength has eroded, in part due to Chicago
school skepticism about the likelihood and sustainability of oligopolistic
coordination. 131 As courts come to recognize that coordination is a
substantially greater concern in modern economics than it appeared to
Chicago-oriented commentators and courts, they can be expected to
strengthen the presumption by requiring stronger rebuttal evidence for any
given concentration level and increase.132
CONCLUSION
Coordinated oligopoly outcomes arise when ﬁrm conduct is substantially
inﬂuenced by the prospect of rivals’ reactions. Reactions can be purposive,
designed to punish cheating from consensus terms of coordination, but they
need not be. They can also be nonpurposive: natural and predictable
responses to the change in a ﬁrm’s competitive environment when one of its
rivals makes a competitive move such as a price change. We do not suppose
that either purposive or nonpurposive coordination is inevitable in oligopoly
markets, nor that it invariably raises price substantially above the nonstrategic
benchmark. But, as we have demonstrated, coordinated oligopoly outcomes
are common and harmful.
While we have stressed the broad scope of strategic conduct and
coordinated outcomes, we have also explained that even narrowly deﬁned
“coordination” is not as diﬃcult and unlikely as Chicago-oriented courts and
commentators suppose. Criminal convictions for illegal collusion are surely
the tip of that iceberg, and are themselves not rare.

130 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (indicating that a merger which
produces a ﬁrm controlling a high market share and results in a signiﬁcant increase in market
concentration is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined
absent evidence clearly showing otherwise).
131 Baker, supra note 7, at 77-80. The nadir was the inﬂuential Baker Hughes decision of the D.C.
Circuit, handed down in 1990, which described concentration as simply “a convenient starting point”
for a “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis, United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984
(D.C. Cir. 1990), and explicitly disclaimed a requirement that defendants make a “clear showing” to
rebut the inference of competitive harm. Id. at 992.
132 For a complementary analysis and a discussion of legislative options for strengthening the
structural presumption, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market
Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). See also Baker, supra note 7, at 77-79
(justifying the structural presumption based on an error-cost analysis).
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In short, coordination is a serious concern in oligopoly, underrated by the
Chicagoans and those inﬂuenced by their skepticism. Particularly when
Sherman Act enforcement against coordination would be weak or
inappropriate, but not only then, merger policy should be alert to the risks of
coordinated eﬀects, broadly construed, and rely on a strengthened structural
presumption in horizontal merger analysis to help control those risks.

